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LABOR LAW-LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, SECTION
14 (c) AND NATIONAL LABOR POLICY REQUIRE AFFMATIVE
DECLINATION BY NLRB BEFORE STATE MAY ASSUME JURIS-
DICTION. Stryjewski v. Local 830, Brewery Distributor Drivers
(Pa. 1967).
Plaintiff, owner-operator of a small beer distributorship in Phila-
delphia, was picketed by the Beer Drivers' Union for the purposes
of advertising the non-union nature of the business and organizing
the employees. Since plaintiff's source of supply was a union shop,
the drivers supplying him would not cross the picket lines; and, as a
consequence, profits began to decline. In addition, due to a collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the supplier, plaintiff
was prevented from procuring beer at the supplier's place of busi-
ness. Plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction from the Court of
Common Pleas in Philadelphia in order to restrain the union from
picketing until the merits of the case could be heard. State relief
was sought because the number of the plaintiff's employees and his
yearly gross sales did not meet the National Labor Relations
Board's' minimum jurisdictional standards for a retail enterprise.2
The court, however, refused to entertain the suit, reasoning that the
jurisdiction of the Board was exclusive over disputes that are
arguably within the minimum standards. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, held, affirmed: A state court should not
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute until the National Labor
Relations Board has affirmatively declined jurisdiction. Stryjewski
v. Local 830, Brewery Distributor Drivers, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d
264 (1967).
The field of labor relations has, in the past, been one of federal
preemption.3 Yet, the disparity between a judicially idealistic doctrine
1 National Labor Relations Board, created under the National Labor Relations Act,
49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act),
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1964), is authorized to assume jurisdiction in all disputes
which "affect" interstate commerce. For the definition of "affecting commerce" see
29 U.S.C. § 152(6)(7) (1964).
2 Under the discretionary authority granted by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin) § 701(a) (presently codified in Labor-
Management Relations Act at 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)(2) (1964)), the Board an-
nounced that it will assert jurisdiction over all retail business having a yearly gross
volume of at least $500,000. See NLRB Release No. R-576, October 2, 1958, 42
LRRM 96 (1958).
8 San Diego Bldg. Trades Coundil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959); Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Ed., 353 U.S. 1, 11 (1957); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U.S. 468, 476 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters, Local, 776, 546 U.S. 485, 490-91
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of a uniform labor policy and the lack of administrative funds4 for
such a policy created the proverbial "no man's land" in labor rela-
tions. The genesis of this problem can be traced to Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board5 where the Supreme Court ruled that states were
without authority to assume jurisdiction over disputes within the
NLRB's statutory jurisdiction. After Guss, however, the Board,
because of administrative overload, continued to exercise its discre-
tion in refusing to hear all cases within its exclusive jurisdiction.6
The combination of these two factors produced the jurisdictional
gap-labor's "no man's land."7 Congress, in passing Section 701 of
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which
amended the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, attempted
to end this quandary." The amendment, now incorporated as section
14(c) (1) (2) of the LMRA, gives the states residual jurisdiction:
(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or
by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
any class or category of employers, where in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or
bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory ... from
assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes which the
Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to
assert jurisdiction.9
Although the amendment was designed to eliminate the jurisdictional
(1953). See McCoid, Notes on a "G-String"; A Study of the "No Man's Land" of
Labor Law, 44 MrVNN. L. REv. 205, 206 n.6 (1959) for helpful articles in this area.
4 Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board,
70 YALE L.J. 729, 735 (1961).
5 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
0 E.g., Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1948).
7 See generally Cohen, Congress Clears the Labor No Man's Land, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 333 (1961); Cox, The Landrum-Griflin Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Hanley, Federal-State Jurisdiction in
Labor's No Alan's Land: 1960, 48 GEo. L.J. 708 (1960); McCoid, Notes on a
"G-String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor Law, 44 MINN. L. REV. 205
(1959).
8 One writer states that:
[s]ince a majority of the states do not have a 'modem' labor relations code
which grants, among other things, the right of self organization and collective
bargaining, this solution of the no man's land problem must be counted as
a net loss to workers and to the trade union movement.
Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L.
REV. 195, 235 (1960).
9 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)(2) (1964).
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gap by giving the states jurisdiction over labor disputes 0 declined 1
by the Board, it has inadvertently- created a "hesitation land" in some
states because courts will not utilize the amendment to act initially
in determining jurisdiction. This hesitation stems from pre-LMRDA
decisions by the Supreme Court in the area of federal preemption.
The most important of these is San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon'2 in which the Court held that the states cannot assume
jurisdiction over conduct arguably protected under section 7 or
prohibited under section 8 of the amended National Labor Relations
Act.'1 Though Congress has made evident its intention for the states
to assume jurisdiction where the Board so declines, one of the ques-
tions yet to be answered by either Congress or the Supreme Court is:
Must the Board make the initial determination whether an enterprise
will satisfy its jurisdictional yardstick, or may the states under
section 14(c) (2) make the determination before assuming juris-
diction?'"
Under section 14(c), the Board has promulgated monetary guide-
lines due to its inability to handle all the cases over which it has legal
jurisdiction.:5 The standard for retailers is determined by gross
volume of yearly sales. 16
In the Stryjewski case, the plaintiff was a retailer with a yearly sales
volume of $230,000, whereas the minimum retail volume established
by the Board is $500,000. Nevertheless, the court chose to remain
within the shadow of the Garmon requirement,'7 i.e., that the dispute
10 "Labor Dispute" as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
§ 2(9), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (presently codified in 29 U.S.C. § 152(9)):
[I]ncludes any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employ-
ment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating
1'. or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment ...
tt The Board, in 1958, used press releases to establish its jurisdictional yardsticks,
and Congress ratified this action by requiring the Board not to decline jurisdiction over
any case over which it would have assumed jurisdiction on August 1, 1959. Thus far,
however, the Board has failed to utilize the Administration Procedure Act, as provided
for in section 14(c) (1), to decline jurisdiction.
12 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
13 Id. at 246. See § 7 and § 8 of the amended National Labor Relations Act
(presently codified in 29 U.S.C. § 157-58 (1964)) for the federally protected and
prohibited unfair labor practices.
14 Another question that arises after the states have in some manner assumed juris-
diction is: May the states apply any law to decide the labor dispute? This question
is not explored. Compare Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1098 (1960) with Papps, Section 701 and the
State Courts: What Law to Be Applied?, 48 Gao. L.J. 316, 317 (1959).
15 See Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1958), amended, 124 N.L.R.B.
594 (1959).
16 Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88 (1958).
17 426 Pa. 512, -, 233 A.2d 264, 267 (1967). Accord, Lay v. Electrical Workers,
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not be arguably within section 8 before the state court assumes juris-
diction. After applying the Garmon "arguably" test, the court as-
sumed arguendo that even if the plaintiff had been able to prove in
the lower court that, due to his $230,000 gross volume, the Board
would in all probability decline jurisdiction, the question still
remained as to whether the state court could assume jurisdiction
before the NLRB had in fact refused to hear the dispute.
Because of this somewhat cryptic nexus between the "arguably"
test and in fact declination by the Board, the inference to be drawn
from Stryjewski is that arguability has been liberally extended to in-
clude "slight probability," and therefore-as a practical matter-
states cannot assume jurisdiction without an actual NLRB decli-
nation.
This liberal interpretation, however, appears tenuous. Mr. Justice
Bell, in his dissenting opinion, highlights the illogic of the majority
by stating: "In these highly controversial and emotional days, the
[arguably test] . . . is one of the most unrealistic and unjustifiable
ever invented. Is there any topic, subject, question or issue upon
which there is no argument today? The aforesaid 'arguably' test
should be quickly changed by Congress or by the Supreme Court."'18
The only instances in which the "arguably" test appears palatable
occur when there is a close question as to meeting the Board's
standards or when the facts reveal that the minimum business volume
necessary for Board determination has been exceeded. Illustrative of
this latter instance is the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision
in Lay v. Electrical Workers, Local 17419 decided subsequent to
Stryjewski. There the court was concerned with a non-retail firm-
the Board's minimum standard for which is $50,000, measured by
an inflow-outflow volume.20 Since the plaintiff's business volume was
Local 174, 427 Pa. 387, 235 A.2d 402 (1967); Cox's Food Center, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, Local 1653, 420 P.2d 645 (Idaho 1966) (required lower court to petition for
advisory opinion before making any decision on the merits); Council of Carpenters
v. District Court, 155 Colo. 54, 392 P.2d 601 (1964) (distinguished in Russell v.
Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 27, 409 P.2d 926, 929, 48 Cal. Rptr.
702, 705 (1966) as a case obviously falling within Board's standards); Russell v.
Electrical Workers Local 569, 43 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1966), rev'd, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409
P.2d 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966); Barksdale & Le Blanc v. Local 130, Elec. Workers,
143 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
18 426 Pa. 512, -," 233 A.2d"264, 269 n.4 (1967).
19 427 Pa. 387, 235 A.2d 402 (1967).
20 Although difficult to apply because the commerce data required by this standard
is complex, the inflow-outflow is a more accurate indication of impact on interstate
1968]
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$73,000 and the dispute could possibly be disruptive of interstate
commerce upon its facts, the case was "arguably" if not obviously
within the Board's jurisdiction.
However, under the Stryjewski facts, the same court gave the
"arguably" test a strained interpretation because of the conclusion
that an attempt by the states to apply the Board's standards, as well
as the numerous variables utilized in administrative determinations,
would lead to a chaotic situation. Reverting to the spirit of Garmon,21
the court envisaged this chaos as inimical to the national labor policy.
Contrary to the Stryjewski rationale, commentators have criticized 2
any attempt to apply the Garmon test to a determination whether the
NLRB would assert jurisdiction in a particular case on the basis of
its published jurisdictional yardsticks. The proper application of the
Garmon doctrine, it is contended, should be limited to a determina-
tion whether the conduct complained of is protected or prohibited
under the amended Act; furthermore, it is believed that the question
whether the Board would assume jurisdiction over such conduct
cannot be decided on the basis of the Garmon decision.
This contention, however, overlooks the methodology used by the
Board in considering jurisdiction. Indeed, the determination of a
procedural problem has in many cases involved a decision of substan-
tive law.28 The Board has considered the nature of the action in con-
junction with the application of the jurisdictional standards. For in-
stance, in a case involving a secondary boycott of a retail enterprise,
the primary employer who seeks relief will have added to his gross
volume the volume of the boycotted firm. This relatively simple
example may be expanded to encompass the following situation:
The Board in a union's petition for election refuses to hear the dis-
pute because of the inadequate dollar volume. The union, unable
to obtain relief, begins a secondary boycott of firms supplying the
employer. The Board will now decide the original unfair labor prac-
commerce than the gross volume yardstick. This is due to the fact that the inflow.
outflow yardstick measures the volume crossing state lines.
21 The Garmon Court stated, "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8
of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive com-
petence of the National labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245.
22 Hanley, supra note 7, at 713; 80 HARv. L. REv. 1600, 1603 (1966).
23 Senator Morse remarked during debate on section 14(c) (1): "The same em-
ployer and indeed the same labor dispute can be both inside and outside of the Board's
standards, depending on the nature of the proceeding." 105 CONG. REC. 17878 (1959).
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tice based upon the additional dollar volume of the boycotted firms 4
However, the Board will not exercise its jurisdiction to hold an
election on the basis of the union's petition, since that issue involves
only the primary employer, whose gross volume of business continues
to fall short of the jurisdictional yardstick.
Other factors frequently taken into account by the Board are the
lowering of the employer's volume because of strikes, 25 and the
lack of volume figures for the entire year 20 In the former instance,
the Board will not take the lower volume; rather, it will look to
preceding years' records. In the latter case, the enterprise's yearly
earnings will be projected according to available information. The
Board, in addition to these factors, has considered whether the enter-
prise is related to the national defense, or whether it consists of
many integrated companies.28 To compound the problem, the pos-
sibility always exists that the Board may expand its jurisdiction at
any time.20 The questions now arise whether the states could apply
the complex variables presently utilized by the Board, and whether
Congress intended them to do so.
Since the inclusion of section 14(c) in the Labor Management
24 McAllister Transfer Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954); Reilly Cartage Co., 110
N.L.R.B. 1742 (1954).
25 Hygienic Sanitation Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1957).
26 City Line Open Hearth, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 799 (1963).
27 In Ready Mixed Concrete and Materials, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 318, 320 (1958),
the Board stated that to effectuate the Act it must assert jurisdiction over operations
that "exert a substantial impact on national defense irrespective of whether the
enterprise's operations satisfy any of the Board's other jurisdictional standards."
28 T. H. Rogers Lumber Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1732 (1957). For an example of the
complexities of a jurisdictional determination in this area, see Pacific Hosts, Inc-
Padre Trails Motel Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1966) where the Board combined
not only the volume of the management consultant firm (Pacific Host, Inc.) and the
managed motel (Padre), but also lumped together all other motels which Pacific
Host, Inc. had similarly managed.
20 See Cox, supra note 7, at 262. The Board is free at any time to expend its
discretionary power in either a "class or category of employers," but cannot under
section 14(c) reduce its jurisdiction from the level established in August 1, 1959.
The existing doctrine of federal preemption over labor relations was reinforced as a
result of this added restraining clause. The Senators favoring the maintenance of a
strong federal labor policy chose August 1 because as of that date labor and manage-
ment enjoyed their greatest amount of federal protection.
For an example of the Board using its discretion in choosing a "class" of employer
over whom it will assert jurisdiction, see Platbush General Hospital, 126 N.L.R.B.
144 (1960). Congress, in allowing the Board in its discretion to choose or restrict an
entire class of employees, nullified the Supreme Court decision in Hotel Employees
Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958). Note, Evangline Downs, Inc. v. Pari-
Mutual Clerks, Local 328, 191 So. 2d 358 (La. Ct. App. 1966) where the state court
refused to assert jurisdiction even though the Board has never heard a dispute involving
the racing industry.
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Relations Act, several views have been proposed which attempt to
theorize what Congress intended. First, there is the view espoused in
Stryjewski that Congress did not write section 14(c) with the idea
of removing small businesses from the purview of the national labor
policy, 0 and to this extent Garmon remains a valid expression of
that policy.31 Another theory regards the policy of administrative
advisory opinions32 as evidence that section 14(c) does not give
state courts carte blanche to disregard the Board."
However, in opposing these interpretations, those who advocate
that states may assume jurisdiction without a specific declination,
theorize that a simple reading of section 14(c) manifests a con-
gressional intent to permit a general Board declination of jurisdic-
tion in lieu of a case by case approach. The tenor of the discussion in
Congress, it is contended,3 4 does not indicate that the Board's declina-
tion was to be a condition precedent to seeking state relief.
30 Senator John Kennedy remarked during the Conference Committee report:
In that connection, I assure the Senator from Colorado that I shall watch
very carefully what actions are taken by these various States, because if any
effort is made to use this provision as an opportunity to limit rights which
all of us believe all American working people and employers in these States
have, then it will be very easy under this provision for the National Labor
Relations Board by administrative decision to assume much fuller jurisdic-
tion. 105 CONG. REC. 17902 (1959).
For a capsule summary of the debates, see Blumrosen, The New Federalism In Labor
Law, in SYMPosIuM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DisCuosuR AcT
OF 1959, 693, 722 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961). But see McCoid, supra note 3, at 249-56.
31 McCoid, supra note 3, at 240 believes that the Board, in light of Garmon, should
decide all questionable cases of jurisdiction. He apparently does not think Garmon
requires an initial Board determination in all questions involving jurisdiction.
32 Under the procedure established in 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.39, 101.40, 24 Fed. Reg.
9115 (1959), an advisory opinion may be requested by any party to a labor dispute
or by any state court or agency for a dispute before it. The petition for the opinion
must allege the nature of the business and information regarding its finances and
commerce.
The advisory opinions were instituted to expedite the jurisdictional determination.
They are given great weight by the courts, but are not binding on them. In Hirsch v.
McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court held since the Board did not
decline jurisdiction over the category of employers now seeking relief, the advisory
opinions were not equivalent to "rules of decision," therefore, they are not a binding
declination.
For Pennsylvania's view of a formal declination, see Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Bd. v. Butz, 411 Pa. 360, 192 A.2d 707 (1963), where the court reasoned that the
declination must arise from some formality, and a letter from the Director declining
jurisdiction was sufilcient formality. The court points out in a footnote, however, an
advisory opinion from the National Board would have superceded the regional Direc-
tor's letter had it been requested.
33 See Goldberg & Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments, with Emphasis
on the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 747, 753 (1960).
84 See Cohen, supra note 7, at 348. See also Cox, supra note 7, at 262; Reilly,
Federal-State Jurisdiction, 48 GEo. L.J. 304, 311 (1959). Hanley, supra note 7, at
713-14, however, also suggests it would be advisable in close cases for the litigants
to seek an advisory opinion. But see 105 CoNG. REC. 17877-79 (1959) (remarks of
Sen. Morse).
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A few state courts 5 have accepted this challenge and have applied
the Board's standards. The foremost case, Russell v. Electrical Work-
ers Local 569,'6 decided in California, answered the Garmon decision
without making reference to it. The Russell court, in refusing to
accept that the tenor of Garmon applies to a jurisdictional determina-
tion, concluded that it did "not undertake to interpret statutory
language .... Rather, [it sought] only to apply standards which
the board has laid down .... ,.37 for administrative and judicial
guidance.
Other state opinions in rapport with Russell adopted jurisdiction
on one of the following grounds: state policy,38 pre-LMRDA state
decision,39 commentator analysis,40 or implications of a recent Su-
preme Court decision.4' In Russell itself, the court relied on Radio
Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Service42 where the
Supreme Court, in reversing a state judgement, held that "a proper
determination [must be made] of whether the case is actually one
of those which the Board will decline to hear."43 This wording was
interpreted to mean that since the Supreme Court did not explicitly
exclude the states from making the "proper determination," they
must be competent in this regard. ,
However, an analysis of the entire Supreme Court decision does
not give rise to the implication found instrumental in Russell. The
Russell court would probably have been justified in implying such
a conclusion if the phrase read "a proper determination of whether
the case is actually one which the Board would decline to hear." Yet
without the use of the conditional would," Russell's argument ap-
35 Vegas Franchises, Ltd. v. Culinary Workers, Local 226, 427 P.2d 959 (Nev.
1967); Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (1966); Continental Slip Form Builders v. Construction & Gen. Labor,
Local 1290, 193 Kan. 459, 393 P.2d 1004 (1964); Local 227, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Fleishaker, 384 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1964); Smith v. Noel, 24 Ohio Op. 2d
159, 188 N.E.2d 195 (Ct. Common Pleas 1963).
36 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966).
37 Id. at 28, 409 P.2d at 930, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
38 Vegas Franchises, Ltd. v. Culinary Workers, Local 226, 427 P.2d 959, 960 (Nev.
1967) (union picketed employer contrary to employees' clear intent not to organize).
30 Continental Slip Form Builders v. Construction & Gen. Labor, Local 1290, 193
Kan. 459, 462, 393 P.2d 1004, 1006 (1964) (relied on Binder v. Construction &
Gen. Labor Local 685, 181 Kan. 799, 317 P.2d 371 (1957) which is tenuous in
light of San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
40 Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fleishaker, 384 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Ky.
1964) (relies chiefly on McCoid, supra note 3, and Cohen, supra note 7, at 342 n.42).
41 Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 26, 409 P.2d 926, 929,
48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 705 (1966).
42 380 U.S. 255 (1965).
43 Id. at 256.
44 But see Merrifield, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations Law, 29 GEo.
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pears tenuous. By focusing only on this statement, the court over-
looked the Supreme Court's later statement in Broadcast Service:
The record made below is more than adequate to show that all
these factors [criteria used by board] are present... and that this
is not a case which the Board has announced it would decline to
hear.45
This conclusion more properly indicates a Supreme Court intent to
have state courts yield to the NLRB when the record presents factors
that are customarily passed on by the Board.
Absent a Supreme Court ruling on the proper forum to make the
,initial determination of jurisdiction, analyses must be made of (1)
the possible ramifications of state courts' determining the proper
forum; (2) the problem in the states of allocating the burden of
proof as to whether the Board would or would not decline jurisdic-
tion; and (3) although peripheral to the main problem of jurisdic-
tion, as a practical matter, the ability of state trial judges to apply
the complex jurisdictional standards consistent with 40 the Board's
pronouncements.47
The ramifications that may arise from some states' intially assum-
ing jurisdiction are difficult to establish. It has been urged that small
businesses receive preferential treatment over labor unions in certain
states, yet this is primarily due to a lack of comprehensive labor
legislation rather than any law overtly protecting the businessman.48
Though it is dear that state jurisdiction will not precipitate a mass
exodus to states having a preferable business climate, the additional
factors of state jurisdiction and state-afforded remedies could have a
substantial effect on the small businessman's attitude toward his
choice of location.49
WASH. L. REv. 318, 327 (1960) where Representative Griffin, discussing his analysis
of the amendment, granted the states jurisdiction over the cases the Board has declined
or would decline.
45 380 U.S. at 257.
46 See Papps, supra note 33, at 319.
47 Cohen, supra note 7, at 348 argues the wording and tenor of section 14(c) negates
any congressional apprehension of this problem.
48 Delony, State Power To Regulate Labor-Management Relations, in SYMpOSIUm
ON THE LABOR-AI-NAGEMENT REPORTING AND DisCLOSuaU Acr OF 1959, 666, 688
(R. Slovenko ed. 1961); Rayack, LMRDA And The Prospects For Union Growth, in
SYMpOSim ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 109, 110 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961). See
generally Merrifield, State Labor Relations Legislation, in SYMPOSiUM ON THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSuRE Acr OF 1959, 734 (R. Slovenko ed.
1961).
49 But see Cohen, supra note 7, at 336 n.15. He states:
The argument, although emotionally attractive to pro-union Congressmen,
[Vol. 5
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Assuming that small businessmen in most instances need to be
free from extensive economic struggles with unions,50 state jurisdic-
tion and expeditious relief could give rise to business location shop-
ping. This, however, would not only impede commerce, but would
also reject the well established doctrine of a uniform labor policy.
The second analysis of state proceedings focuses upon the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. The task of showing that the Board
would decline jurisdiction almost invariably falls on the businessman
since he is the one seeking relief.51 Precedent has shown this to be a
major obstacle to petitioners; and in some cases dealing with this
problem, the businessman has been unable to sustain this burden of
proof.52 However, in the Florida case of Operating Engineers Local
675 v. Meekins, Inc.,53 the ultimate burden of proof lay with the
union, as appellant, to show that the plaintiff-contractor, by suf-
ficiently engaging in interstate commerce, had come within the ambit
of the Board's jurisdiction. The union failed in this attempt due to
its inability to prove that the in-state suppliers of the plaintiff had
purchased their goods out-of-state. Though the union, through stipu-
lation, was able to establish the Board's minimum inflow-outflow
yardstick for nonretail enterprises," the court ruled this insufficient
by itself to "affect" interstate commerce. Yet in cases which follow
the prevalent rule, and in which there is a close question as to NLRB
standards, the result of requiring businessmen to prove that the
Board would decline jurisdiction " is a furtherance of the uniform
(see, e.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 18143 (1959) (remarks of Congressman Dent)),
would seem to have been a fallacious one; for any manufacturing business
large enough to consider moving from north to south because of favorable
state labor laws would surely be large enough to come within the NLRB's
non-retail jurisdictional standards and thus still to remain under the L.M.R.A.
50 See Chief Justice Bell's dissent in Stryjewski v. Brewery Distrib. Drivers, Local
830, 426 Pa. 512, 519, 233 A.2d 264, 269 (1967).
51 Compare Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 28-29, 409
P.2d 926, 930-31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 706-07 (1966) with Hanley, supra note 7, at
714-15 (1960) and Reilley, supra note 34, at 311.
62 See Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48
Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966); Smith v. Noel, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 159, 188 N.E.2d 195 (Ct.
Common Pleas 1963). For examples of businessmen sustaining the burden of proof
see Vegas Franchises, Ltd. v. Culinary Workers, Local 226, 427 P.2d 959 (Nev.
1967); Continental Slip Form Builders v. Construction & Gen. Labor, Local 1290,
193 Kan. 459, 393 P.2d 1004 (1964) (plaintiff able to show all but $7,000 worth of
steel bought within Kansas).
53 175 So.2d 59 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
54 See text accompanying note 20 supra. See also Siemons Mailing Serv., 122
N.L.R.B. 80 (1958), amended 124 N.L.R.B. 594 (1959).
55 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has apparently allocated the burden of proof
differently in similar cases which were heard no more than two months apart.
In Stryjewski v. Local 830, Brewery Distrib. Drivers, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264, 267
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labor policy, and a disregard for the state and local concern of
protecting the small businessman.!0
Thirdly, as a policy matter, the diversity of opinion that may well
follow from trial judges' inexperience in applying the complex
standards of the Board must be balanced against the utility of an
expeditious state remedy. Mr. Justice Tobriner, speaking for the
Supreme Court of California in Russell, concluded:
Neither the fact that state courts might experience difficulty in apply-
ing the board standards in certain cases nor the danger that those
courts might reach diverse interpretations of those standards compels
a ruling requiring a fruitless expedition to the board. The proper
correctives to the stated problems lie in more dearly articulated
board standards and in the availability of Supreme Court review of
the state determinations. 57
Apparently, the Russell court has found that the utility of state juris-
diction outweighs the difficulties presented. However, the court does
not acknowledge the fact that the appeal may not be fruitless if it
prevents these problems from arising. In addition, the court un-
knowingly undermines its conclusion that expeditious state relief is
a necessity by suggesting increased availability to the Supreme Court
for review as an answer.
Congress, it would appear, intended state courts to assert juris-
diction so that relief could be obtained in those labor disputes that
clearly do not meet the NLRB's yardsticks. However, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, under facts which clearly did not meet these
yardsticks, decided not to assert jurisdiction, whereas the California
Supreme Court, under facts arguably within them, entertained the
dispute, only to deny relief.
In view of this conflict between the states, the decision will rest
with the Supreme Court to determine whether the national labor
policy necessitates the Board to make a jurisdictional determination
in the first instance. Should the Court decide that initial determina-
(1967), the court stated that the petitioners had the burden of showing that the NLRB
would not assume jurisdiction, whereas in Lay v. Electrical Workers, Local 174, 427
Pa. 387, 235 A.2d 402, 403 (1967), the court quoted the following perplexing state-
ment from City Line Open Hearth, Inc. v. Hotel Employees, Local 568, 413 Pa. 420, 427,
197 A.2d 614, 618 (1964): "Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B. must be
readily ascertainable from the averments of fact contained in the complaint itself, or
must be affirmatively proved by the party alleging such jurisdiction."
56 Cox, Federalism In The Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAuv. L. RaV. 1297, 1305
(1954).
57 64 Cal. 2d 22, 25-26, 409 P.2d 926, 928, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (1966).
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tion by the states is not inimical to the national policy, hopefully, a
degree of uniformity will be maintained by a requirement as to the
burden of proof. If the Court, however, decides that an in fact
declination by the Board must follow when the dispute is arguably
within its jurisdiction, the "arguably" test should be given a restricted
meaning to enable the purpose of 14(c) -expeditious state relief-
to be implemented.
DAVID L. McKENNA
